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Summary findings
Reformulating tariff and subsidy policies is central to  o There is little income-related differentiation in
improving water and sanitation services in developing  consumption and therefore  in effective piped water
countries. The traditional model of state enterprise  tariffs. Volume-based tariffs would generate cross-
service provision, coupled with residential tariffs set well  subsidies from the rich to the poor if the rich consumed
below the cost of service, has generally delivered  more water. But the data indicate that consumption of
unsatisfactory results. Low internal generation of funds  piped water varies little with income, so most of the
has impeded expansion of networks into poor  water subsidy is captured by the nonpoor.
communities and has resulted in very poor services there.  0  Poor households that are not presently connected
Most of the subsidy has benefited higher-income groups.  would clearly benefit from access to piped water supply.
Reformers have proposed private provision to improve  This would require increasing tariffs to cost-reflective
efficiency, cost-reflective tariffs to permit the systems to  levels. But where the urban poor already enjoy access,
meet demand, and better-targeted  subsidies.  such tariff increases would have a disproportionate
But is there empirical evidence that existing subsidies  impact on this income group. This impact should be
are ineffective and that the poor could pay the full cost  mitigated through better-targeted, temporary  subsidies.
of water services? Analyzing household survey and water  o The poor  are often willing to pay much more than
company data from cities of Central America and  the present tariff for access to piped water but not
Venezuela, Walker, Ordofiez, Serrano, and Halpern  necessarily the full cost of the monthly consumption
confirm that:  assumed by planners (30 cubic meters). If tariffs were set
* Households without piped connections pay a lot for  to cover long-run financial costs, many poor households
small amounts of water from "coping sources."  . would consume much less. Improving the design of tariff
- Most public water companies undercharge hugely,  structures and extending metering to such households
providing an implicit, generalized subsidy and  would permit them to regulate their expenditures on
accelerating their systems' decapitalization.  water by controlling their consumption.
This paper-a  product of the Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure  Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean
Region-is  part of a larger effort in the region to evaluate and disseminate lessons of experience in designing policies to
improve the quality and sustainability of infrastructure services and to enhance the access  of the poor to these basic  services.
Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact
Silvia  Delgado, room I5-196, telephone 202-473-7840, fax 202-676-1821, email address sdelgado@worldbank.org. Policy
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/research/workingpapers. The authors may
be contacted at iwalker@esa.hn or jhalpern@worldbank.org.  November 2000. (23 pages)
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Abstract
The reformulation  of tariffs and subsidy  policies is central  to the reform of water and sanitation  services  in
developing  countries.  The  traditional  model  of service  provision  has  coupled  public  ownership  with  tariffs  that  are
set well below  the cost  of the service,  justifying  this in terms  of the importance  of water services  for the health
status  of the poor. However,  results have often been unsatisfactory.  Service  quality and coverage  remain
inadequate  in many countries,  and subsidies  directed  at public water companies  have often benefited  the
middle  classes  rather  than  the poor,  who remain  unconnected  to the public  network.  Reformers  have  proposed
to break out of this "low level equilibrium"  through  a combination  of  private sector provision  (to improve
efficiency),  full-cost  tariffs (to permit  the expansion  of the service  in line with demand),  and better  targeting  of
subsidies  (to ensure  that reform  does  not have  a negative  impact  on the poor).  However,  there is a scarcity  of
empirical  evidence  regarding  the current  distribution  of subsidies  and  the demand  for water  services,  so that  the
proposition  that subsidies  are poorly  distributed and that  the urban  poor are willing  to pay for efficient  piped
water  services  are often  offered  up as items  of faith. This paper  seeks  to contribute  to the discussion  of sector
reform  through  an empirical  analysis  of water  tariffs, subsidies  and water demand  in Central  American  and
Venezuelan  cities,  based  on household  survey  data  generated  during  1995-98.
The analysis  confirms  that households  without  a piped  connection  pay large  sums  for small  amounts  of water
from  "coping  sources".  Few  countries  have  explicit subsidy  policies  for piped  water,  but a comparison  between
existing  tariffs and the estimated  efficient  cost of providing  water shows  that most public water companies
undercharge  hugely,  leading  to a generalized  implicit  subsidy  and to accelerating  de-capitalization  of their
systems.  The study  also  shows  that there is little  income-related  differentiation  in effective  piped  water  tariffs.
Each  of the  cities  studied  had volume-based  tariffs,  which  would  generate  cross  subsidies  from the rich to the
poor  if the  rich were  to consume  more  water. In  fact, the consumption  of piped water  varies  little  with income.
As a result,  the richest  60% of households  capture  most of the implicit  subsidy.  The obvious  way  to favor  the
poor is to increase  coverage,  rather  than  to subsidize  piped  water.  Nevertheless,  in cities where piped  water
coverage  is high, many relatively  poor households  at present  do receive  a significant  subsidy.  Since  poorer
households  spend  a higher  proportion  of their income  on water services,  raising  tariffs  to cost-reflective  levels
would affect  these groups  disproportionately.  In this situation,  the introduction  of targeted  subsidies  could  be
used  to avoid  a negative  impact  on the  poor  of global  tariff  adjustments.
The second  part of the paper  analyzes  the demand  for water, drawing  on both contingent  valuation  estimates
generated  by "willingness  to pay"  surveys  and  revealed  preference  data.  Contingent  valuation  responses  confirm
that  the poor  are normally  willing  to pay much  more  that the present  tariff  for piped  water. However,  they also
suggest  that the poorest urban households  are not always  willing to pay for the full cost of the standard
monthly  consumption  of 30m 3 often  assumed  by planners.  Revealed  preference  estimates  confirm  that if tariffs
were  set to cover  long run financiai  costs,  average  demand  in many  cities  would  be below  30m 3 a month.  This
reinforces  the  case  basing  the tariff  on  the system  costs  and using  metering  to allow households  to determine
how  much  water they consume  and pay for. In Panama,  metering  lowered  consumption  by over 20% in four
months. Across the  region, survey and focus group findings show that attitudes to  metering in  poor
communities  are generally  positive.  It is regarded  as the fairest  way to charge  for water  and meters  are also
regarded  as a proxy  for tenure  rights  in informal  settlements.  Therefore,  metering  should  be considered  as part
of service  upgrading  programs  and  should  be  promoted  as a means  of fostering  fair  distribution  of costs.
1 ESA  Consultores,  Tegucigalpa,  Honduras.
2 LCSFP,  World  Bank.I  Introduction
Ready  access  to clean  and safe water is taken for granted  in industrialized  countries.  But in poor countries,
large proportions  of both urban and rural households  do not have  access  to safe water. In Central  America,
"potable"  water  coverage  ranges  from under  40 % to 70% in rural regions  and the average  national  coverage
in urban  areas  lies  in the  range  80% to 90%,  although  some  individual  cities  have  coverage  of up to 100%.  For
those  with access,  the  water is frequently  not  potable  in the strict  sense  of the word  and the quality  of service
(frequency,  pressure  and  quality  of the  water  supplied)  is often  poor  (Walker  and  Velasquez,  1999).
The coverage  and quality  of the service  is generally  correlated  with income  and wealth  and the poorer the
country,  the closer the correlation.  Where  there are not enough  public  resources  to provide  piped  water for
everyone,  the better  off have  usually  exercised  political  influence  to ensure  that  their  communities  are included
in the  formal piped  water  network  and  receive  a service  superior  to  that  available  in lower  income  communities.
The poor adopt coping  strategies  To compensate  for the absence  or inadequacy  of the piped  water supply,
which include  the purchase  of water from trucks and hauling  water from standpipes  or domestic  faucets  in
neighboring  communities.  Such strategies  are normally  extremely  expensive  in terms of money  and time. In
contrast,  piped  water  normally  is priced  well below  the marginal  cost  of provision.
The production  and distribution  of potable  water has the characteristics  of a natural  monopoly,  due to the
costliness  of moving  raw  water between  river  basins  and  of duplicating  local  distribution  networks.  At the same
time, universal  access  to adequate  water  and sanitation  services  has long been recognized  as a cornerstone
of public  health  and  an essential  component  of individual  well being.  The traditional  response  of governments
to  these  twin  concerns  has  been  public  ownership,  management  and  financing  of water  companies  and  setfing
tariffs  at levels  deemed  affordable  to all households,  both  for distributional  and  public  health  motives.  As these
tariffs were on average below the level required  to recover costs, implicit and explicit operational  and
investment  subsidies  were established  to bolster  the precarious  financial  position  of the  water companies.  At
the same time,  there was a progressive  accretion  of complex  and contradictory  cross-subsidies,  which aimed
to redistribute  income  between  social  groups.
When the  poorest  households  do not have  access  to piped  water,  the  argument  for subsidizing  the tariff  loses
much of its force, since the resulting subsidy  distribution  is likely to be regressive.  When the available
resources  are "captured"  by better-off consumers  or by system employees,  low water prices may have
perverse  distributional  consequences.  They present  a financial  obstacle  to the expansion  of services  into the
low-income  communities  and condemn  the poor  to paying  much more for an inferior,  non-piped  service,  even
though  they  may  be able  and  willing  to  pay  the full cost  of a piped  service.
Traditional  tariff arrangements  are also associated  with limited  household-level  metering  of consumption.  For
those without  meters,  the water charge  is simply  a fixed  fee, not linked  to the volume  of consumption.  This
promotes  inefficient  consumer  behavior,  as those  with a superior  supply  consume  water up to the point  where
marginal  utility is zero. In rationed  systems  (including  most urban systems  in Latin  America)  this prevents
increased  consumption  by  other households,  which  still  have  positive  marginal  utiiity.
These  weaknesses  result in two basic types  of problems.  The first is inefficient  resource  allocation.  When
marginal  water tariffs are lower than the marginal  cost of provision,  there is little incentive  for the water
company  to expand  the service  and fewer resources  are allocated  to potable  water provision  than would be
optimal. Moreover,  incomplete  networks  and unreliable  services  result in the adoption  of costly "coping
mechanisms",  such  as  water  distribution  by tanker  trucks  and  by human  haulage,  and  household  investment  in
cisterns.  The second  basic  problem  is that of distributional  inequity,  as subsidies  are regressively  distributed
when  the  poor do not  have  access  to subsidized  piped  water  service.
In recent  years in Central  America,  the multilateral  development  banks  have commissioned  water demand
surveys  and  willingness  to pay studies,  in order to document  the underlying  feasibility  of a policy  shift  towards
tariffs  which reflect  system  costs,  coupled  with the introduction  of targeted  and transparent  demand  subsidies
in place of the global supply subsidies implicit in  generalized  under pricing. Such studies have been
undertaken  by the  consulting  company  ESA  Consultores,  in national  and regional  capitals  in  six  countries  in the
region:
*  Honduras  (1995).  Marginal  barrios  of Tegucigalpa  and the intermediate  cities of San Pedro  Sula, Santa
Rosa  de Copan,  Choluteca  and  Comayagua  (World  Bank  and  IADB).
*  Nicaragua  (1996).  Marginal  barrios  of Managua  (World  Bank).
3This  is  true  so  long  as  the  users  would,  in  fact,  be  prepared  to  pay  a tariff  equal  to  marginal  cost.
2*  El Salvador  (1996).  The whole  of  the intermediate  cities  of Santa  Ana,  San  Miguel  and  Sonsonate  (IADB).
*  Venezuela  (1996).  The  whole  of Caracas,  Barquisimeto  and  Merida  (World  Bank  and  IADB).
*  Venezuela  (1997).  Marginal  barTios  of Caracas  (1997)  (World  Bank).
*  Guatemala  (1997).  Marginal  barrios  of Guatemala  City  (World  Bank).
*  Panama  (1998).  The  whole  of Panama  City  and  Col6n  (World  Bank).
Details  of the survey  universes  are presented  in Annex  1.4  The present  paper brings  together  the results  of
these  studies  in a comparative  framework,  which seeks  to amplify  our understanding  of the microeconomics
and the political  economy  of water supply  in low-income  communities  in the Latin  America.  The paper also
highlights  the  policy  implications  of its  findings.  It is divided  into  four principal  sections:
*  The distributional impact of tariffs for piped water services
Section  2 analyzes  subsidy  elements  of potable  water  tariffs.  It estimates  the subsidy  households  received  by
income  quintile  in six  cities,  to assess  the  degree  to which  poorer  households  benefit.  The pattern  of access  to
sewerage  services  is also analyzed.  This section  closes  with a discussion  of implications  for the political
economy  of sector  reform.
*  Analysis of water demand  using revealed  preference  data  and contingent valuation survey data
Section  3 compares  findings  on water demand  generated  by two different  methodologies.  It first presents
revealed  preference  data  for water  consumption  and  expenditure  (in  time  and money)  for households  without  a
piped  supply,  which  use  "coping  sources"  and  for those  with  a piped  supply  and  metered  consumption 5. These
data are used to generate  household  water demand  curves  for each of the cities studied.  The revealed
preference  results  are then  compared  with  contingent  valuation  data  on demand  for improved  water  services,
based on responses  to survey  questions.  These  findings  on demand  are then related  to each  system's  costs
and existing  tariffs.
- Attitudes towards metering
Water metering  is desirable  in order to establish  a positive  marginal  consumption  price. It is economically
rational  to  establish  metering  wherever  the economic  opportunity  cost  of water released  by metering  is greater
Further  details  on  the  data  sets  used  for  this  study  are  available  from  the  authors.
5 The  analsis  in  this  section  looks  at  households  that  are  effectively  metered,  whose  consumption  will  expand  to  the  point
where  marginal  utility  is  equal  to the  marginal  tariff.  Many  households  with  a piped  supply  do not  have  effectively  metered
consumption.  They  will  therefore  consume  water  up  to  the  point  where  marginal  utility  is  zero.  This  is  given  by  the  intercept
between  the  demand  curve  and  the  x axis.
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than the cost of metering. This is likely to be the case in rationed systems . But politicians are often reluctant to
install meters, fearing the resistance of low-income communities. In some cases there have indeed been
conflicts around metering. This section presents evidence on attitudes towards water metering taken from the
household surveys and focus group exercises, which show a high potential for acceptance when metering is
associated  with service improvement.
*  Conclusions  and policy  recommendations
The final section summarizes the main findings and their implications  for sectoral policy.
6 Formally,  it is rational  to introduce  metering  wherever  the economic  beneft derived  by the households  who  will get more
water  when other  users  reduce  their  consumption  due to metering  is sufficient  to offset  the costs  of installing  and reading
the meters  plus  the loss  of economic  beneft  of  the users  whose  consumption  will  be reduced  by  metering
42  The  distributional  impact  of tariffs  for piped  water  services
It is well known that households without access to a piped water connection spend a high proportion of their
income on relatively small volumes of water provided by inefficient un-piped services. The benefit to these
households from getting a household connection would be very high indeed. A recent case study of Honduras
underlines this finding (Walker et al, 1999).
However,  it is often also assumed that within  the  scope  of networked  services,  the poor consumers lose out to
the better off, because they receive services of inferior quality and/or because the tariff arrangements are
regressive, due to high fixed charges that penalize households with lower consumption levels, which tend to be
the  poorer  households.  This  hypothesis  implicitly
underlies the assumption that there will  be  political  Water  tariffs  in the  systems  studied
support  from  the  poor  for  policy  changes  which  In the systems  studied  in the present  paper,  the structure
combine  tariff  increases  with  service  quality  of the domestic  water  tariff  at the time of the survey  had
improvements. The present section analyses survey  the  following  characteristics:
data on the consumption  of and payment  for piped . There  was  a fixed  minimum  volume,  which  is  charged
water services by households that  have a domestic  for regardless  of whether  it is consumed.  This is 15
connection, to see to what extent the poor lose out to  m3 in  most places; in  Panama it  is 30  m 3 for
the  rich within the scope of the existing piped water  residential  consumers  and lower amounts  for low-
systems.  income  areas.
Charges levied for the services are compared to the  . The marginal per-meter  charge for  consumption
estimated cost of providing an efficient piped water  above  the minimum  is a progressive  function of the
service. 7 It is shown that tariffs are generally below  total volume  consumed.  In El Salvador  there were 3 ranges;  in Nicaragua  there  were  9; in Panama,  5 and
the efficient financial cost, so the systems as a whole  in  Venezuela  4.  The degree of  progressiveness
are subsidized.  Transfers between richer and poorer  related  to volume  varies  considerably  from place to
households are shown to be small, indicating  a slight  place.
cross subsidy.  . There  are regional  variations,  which aim to capture
This  is  due  to  two  factors.  First,  per-household  differences  in costs and I or in  social conditions.
consumption is similar across income groups. This, in  These  normally specify a  higher tariff  for  the
turn, suggests both  that there is little income elasticity  metropolftan  systeIn ElSealvador there were two
in the demand  for piped water in the cities studied;  (metropolitan  and other); in Nicaragua  there were
and that the  amount of rationing faced by users at  geographical distinctions within  the  capital  city
different levels of the income distribution is similar.  according to  the  distance from  an  historically
important  source  and the regions  paid less  than the
The second factor is the structure of tariffs in the cities  capital;  in Panama  there  were  four regional  or spatial
studied (see text box). In each case, the main source  variants  in the tariff.
of differentiation in  payments was  a  stepped tariff,  . There  was normally  a special  tariff  for "social"  cases.
where  the  charge  per  cubic  meter  rises  as  Sometimes this  only  applies to  standpipes (El
consumption  rises.  In  this  type  of  system,  the  Salvador);  in  other cases it  applies generally  to
"progressivity " of  the tariff structure depends in the  informal  settlements  (Managua,  Panama,  Venezuela).
main on the degree to which the rich consume more  . In all these  systems,  the coverage  of micro  metering
than  the  poor.  However,  water  consumption  is  is relatively  low; in some of them, it is simply  none
generally  stable  across  income  groups,  so  this  existent.  In such conditions,  the water company's
mechanism does not result in differential charges for  discretionary estimates of  each  users  water
richer  households in the cities studied.  However, in  consumption are  crucial to  tariff  setting. This
some cities there  are also "social" tariffs, which do  discretion  is often  used  with  the intention  of trimming
lead  to  differences  between  the  payment  of  the  the bill  to what the company  thinks each part  of the
lowest quintile and other households.  market  will bear.  As a result,  the company's  more  or
less arbitrary  estimates  of  consumption  and their
There are, however, two clearly regressive distributive  decisions  on zoning  (where  this  is a factor  in the  tariff)
impacts of pricing piped water and sanitation services  tum out to be the key determinants  of what people
in  the  cities  studied.  First, where  coverage  is  not  pay  for  water.
universal,  households  without  a  connection  are
denied  any  subsidy and  must  resort  to  use  more
7 For Merida  and Panama,  the cost  data  include  the cost  of  wastewater  collection  and  treatment.
8 At present,  in the systems  analyzed,  costs  are above  efficient  levels.  The present  study uses  as a benchmark  estimated
efficient  costs  based  on forward-looking  projection.  See  Section  2.1.1.  for details.
5costly sources. These households are much more likely to be poor than those with a piped water connection.
Second, differential  access  to  sewerage services results  in  a  regressive transfer  from  poorer  to  richer
households, because the poor are less likely to have a sewerage connection, but the water tariff is usually the
same for those with or without a sewerage connection. However, in the absence of cross country data on
sewerage costs, it was  not possible to quantify this effect.
2.  1  Data
In order to analyze the distributional impact of water tariffs it is necessary to have data for the amount of
subsidy (positive or negative) received by each household and for the income of the household. The following
paragraphs describe the methodology used to arrive  Table 2
at these estimates. This part of the paper is restricted  Long  run average  financial  cost  for piped  water/l
to the cities where the survey universe covered the  Estimated  average  cost  of water,
whole  city population (not just marginal barrios) and  US$  I cubic  meter
where the registers allowed an estimate to be made  Operation  &  Total
of  the  volume  of  piped  water  consumed  at  a  Maintenance
household level.  Managua  0.27  0.47
2.1.1 Cost and subsidy estimates  Merida,  Ven 9  0.09  0.13
For eash system, a benchmark tariff was estimated  Sonsonate,  ES  0.11  0.18
on  the basis of  cost projections including operation  Santa  Ana ES  0.10  0.17
and maintenance and capital costs (financial charges
plus depreciation). This tariff is set to generate a real  San Miguel,  ES  0.12  0.21
rate  of  return  of  12%.  Table  2  summarizes  the  Panama  & Colon  0.59  0.71
resulting estimates. This  allows  us  to  establish  Note: 1/  These  data  in general  reflect  only  the  cost  of piped  water
whether  a given  household  is receiving a  subsidy.  production  and  distribution  and  do not include  that  of wastewater
Those who  pay less  than the  benchmark tariff are  coilection  and  disposal,  except  in  the  case  of Merida  and  Panama,
defined as subsidized, while those who pay more are  where  no  separate  data  were  available  for  water  alone.
being over-charged. Using this framework, the paper
explores the way that differential pricing redistributes
resources between consumers.  Table  3
2.1.2 Household income estimates  Who  gets  piped  water  services?
The household surveys generated data for  monthly  %  of  households  in  each  quintile  with  a  domestic  connection
household  income  based  on  the  incomes  of  all  1  2  3  4  5  All
household members from  all sources.1° These data  Managua  93  97  98  97  98  97
permit  ranking households by per capita income and
grouping them by quintiles from poorest (1) to richest  Merida,  Ven  100  100  100  100  100  100
(5).  This  analysis  could  only  be  done  where  the  Sonsonate,  ES  71  80  84  93  94  84
survey universe covered the whole city population and
not just marginal barrios, as in the latter case no data  Santa  Ana ES  84  92  98  99  100  95
are  available  for  the  upper  range  of  household  San  Miguel,  ES  54  65  67  79  86  70
incomes.  Table  3  shows  the  percentage  of  Panama  and  Colon  98  95  99  100  100  98
households in each income quintile with a domestic
connection for potable water.
For Managua, Merida and Panama & Colon, coverage is very high (close to 100%) for all income groups. This
means that low-income households are likely to receive an important share of any subsidy, unless they are
9  For Merida  no data  are  available  for capital  costs.  The  full cost is  estimated  from the available  data  for O&M  cost  applying
the average  ratio  between  full  and  O&M  cost  reported  for the other  cases.  A more  recent  study  reported  a somewhat  higher
figure  for total  financial  cost  for the Merida  system,  of $0.22 per  cubic  meter  (OXERA,  1999).  However,  this  relates  to a later
period.  The above  estimate  for water  costs  have  been  used  in order  to maintain  methodological  consistency,  because  this
number  relates  to the period  when  the survey  data  were  gathered  (1996).  Note:  even  if the  total  average  financial  cost  were
higher  than is here indicated,  the pattem  of cost distribution  between  income  quintiles  (which is the main focus of the
present  study)  would  not be affected
10  Where  the informant  knew  the job of a household  member  but not their  income,  income  was imputed  from the average
value  reported  by  other  cases  in the  same  database  with  the same  type  of  job.
6subject to disproportionate rationing or  discriminatory pricing. In contrast, in the three  Salvadoran cities of
Sonsonate, Santa Ana and San Miguel  coverage is lower, and is strongly correlated with income.
2.1.3 Water consumption  and expenditure estimates
The  surveys measured expenditure on  piped water for  all  Table  4a
cases  and registered the volume consumed where  meters  Average  household  piped  water  consumption
were  installed  (table  4a).  For  households  without meters,  for metered  households
consumption was imputed using regression analysis of  the
households  with  meters  to  identify  the  main  independent  with  a metered  donesUmc  connection
variables  (apart  from  price)  linked  to  consumption.  The
determinants of water consumption varied from  city to city.  1  2  3  4  5
They included: the frequency of the piped water service, per  Managua  25  57  29  31  28
capita household income, number of people in the household,  Med
geographical location, the  size of the dwelling  or  plot, and  a,Ven  49  35  37  43  40
storage  capacity for  water. The  resulting coefficients were  Sonsonate,  ES  35  26  34  27  28
used  to  estimate piped water  consumption for  un-metered  SantaAnaES  25  31  33  30  31
households.  The  analysis  is  restricted  to  the  cities  with
sufficient observations  of metered consumption to permit this  San  Miguel,  ES  30  34  27  29  26
imputation: Managua, Panama, Merida and the three cities in  Panama  and  Colon  30  29  31  30  37
El Salvador.__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Note:  There  were  sufficient  observations  in  each  case  for
Based  on  this  procedure,  table  4b  shows  estimated  the  average  to  be  statistically  significant.
consumption  in  all  houses with  a  network  connection,  by
household income quintile."  There is little evidence of discriminatory rationing in low-income areas. Average
consumption is higher in the wealthier quintiles in only two cases (Panama and Santa Ana); in all the other
cases, consumption is similar across income groups. This is consistent with the fact that Merida and Managua
have relatively  good coverage and service frequency across the whole network, while both Sonsonate and San
Miguel are small cities where rationing is undertaken in a relatively  uniform fashion.
Table 5 shows piped water expenditure for  households with a domestic connection, and table 6 shows the
implicit price per cubic meter, derived from tables 4 and 5. There is a significant  cross subsidy from  richer to
poorer households only in Managua,  where the richest quintile pays 53% more per cubic meter than the
Table  4b  Table  5
Estimated average household piped  water  Average  expenditure  on piped  water
consumption  for  all households  US$  per  month  spent  on piped  water  by  households  in
M3 per  month  consumed  by households  in each  quintile  each  quintile  with  a  domestic  connection
with  a  domestic  connection,  including  imputed  consumption  1  2  3  4  5
for  unmetered  connections
1  2  3  4  5  Managua  3.5  4.0  3.9  5.0  5.8
Merida,  Ven  2.9  1.7  2.1  2.0  3.5
Managua  23  34  25  26  26  Sonsonate,  ES  5.6  4.7  7.4  5.3  6.2
Merida,  Ven  43  38  38  40  39  Santa  Ana  ES  5.0  7.5  6.9  6.0  6.7
Sonsonate,  ES  30  26  30  27  27  San  Ana ES  5.7  7.5.3  6.3  7.0
Santa  Ana ES  25  29  30  31  34  San  Miguel,  ES  5.7  7.4  5.3  6.3  7.0
San  Miguel,  ES  30  31  27  30  27  Panama  and Col6n  8.4  10.7 11.2 10.7 12.6
PanamA  and Colon  28  28  30  31  36  Note:  For  households  without  water  meters  consumption
Note:  For  households  without  water  meters  consumption  is  is  imputed.  See  text  for  explanation.
imputed.  See  text  for  explanation.
poorest (table 6). This reflects the failure of INAA (the operating company at the time of the survey) to collect
more than symbolic fees in marginal barrios, which received a good service. In the other cities there is much
less evidence of cross subsidy: in Merida the richest pay only 28% more per cubic meter than the poorest; in
Sonsonate, 28% more; in San Miguel,  37%, in Panama, 13%, and in Santa Ana there is  no difference at all.
11 It might  be argued  that  the procedure  adopted  for imputing  consumption  for un-metered  households  is likely  to result  in
an underestimate,  because  the metered  cases  on which  the imputation  is based  face positive  marginal  prices.  In  contrast,
the un-metered  households  face  a zero  marginal  price  and  are  therefore  likely  - cetens  panbus  - to consume  more  than  a
similar  metered  household.  This effect  is iikely  to be greatest  when  the  supply  is  less  rationed.  In  future  work  we propose  to
refine  these  estimates  by developing  a methodology  to take account  of these  price and rationing  effects  when imputing
consumption  for un-metered  households.
72.2  The  incidence of subsidies
In this section,  the data derived  in Section  2.1 are used to analyze  the distribution  of subsidies.  "Subsidy"  is
defined  as the shortfall  between  the amount  charged  and the benchmark  tariff,  which reflects  the estimated
efficient  cost  of  water  service,  while  households  paying  more  than  the  benchmark  tariff  are deemed  to be "over
charged".  In order to assess distributive  impact, the total  Table  6
subsidy  received  or  over-charge  paid by each quintile is
estimated. In  cities with  high  coverage, subsidies are  Average  unit price  of  piped  water  by quintile
distributed  relatively  evenly  across  income  quintiles,  with the  US$/m
result that the preponderance  of benefts accrue  to the non  1  2  3  4  5
poor. Only in the two Salvadoran  cities with relatively  low
coverage  (Sonsonate  and  San  Miguel)  does  a  different  Managua  0.15 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.23
pattern emerge. Since in these cases, the water users as a  Merida,  Ven  0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.09
whole are being over charged  to generate  transfers  to the
national  water company,  ANDA,  and the poorer households S  0.18 0.18  0.25  0.19  0.23
who are excluded from water coverage avoid paying this; the  Santa  Ana ES  0.20 0.26 0.23  0.19  0.20
resulting distributive  impact within the  water system is  San  Miguel,  ES  0.19 0.24  0.19  0.21  0.26
progressive.  The following  sections  detail the steps of the
analysis.  Panama  &  Colon  0.31  0.38  0.37  0.35  0.35
2.2.1  Subsidies  at  the quintile level  Note:  Derived  from  tables  4 and  5.
Table  7 compares  the price  paid in each quintile  (taken  from  Table  7
table  6) with  the  benchmark  tariff  presented  in table  2, to show
the amount of  implicit subsidy each quintile receives. In  Average  unit  subsidy  of  piped  water  received
Managua  and Panama  all users are quite heavily  subsidized by  the  quintile
and the level of subsidy  is fairly uniform  across  quintiles.  In  US$  per M 3 of subsidy  received  by the households  in
Merida  there is less subsidy but once again it is fairly  even  each  quintile  with  a  domestic  connection
across  quintiles.  In Sonsonate  the average  price of water is  1  2  3  4  5
very close to its  real cost.  Low-income users (the first two
quintiles)  are neither  subsidized  nor over  charged,  but higher  Managua  0.32  0.35  0.31  0.28  0.24
income  users  pay  a small  surcharge.  In San  Miguel  there is a  Merida,  Ven  0.06  0.09 0.08  0.08 0.04
small subsidy  to the very poorest  and a small surcharge  on
the richest.  In Santa  Ana everyone  is overcharged,  and at  Sonsonate,  ES  -0.005  0.00  -0.07  -0.01  -0.05
about the same rate.  Santa  Ana ES  -0.03 -0.09  -0.06  -0.02  -0.03
The total amount  of over charging  or subsidy  received  is a  San  Miguel,  ES  0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.00  -0.05
function  of  the unit  price  of water per cubic  meter,  compared
with its cost, and of the volume  of water consumed  in the  Panamaand  0
quintile.  This,  in  turn,  depends  on  the average  consumption  for  Note:  Derived  from  tables  2 and  6.
households  with  a domestic  connection,  and  on the proportion
of households  with  piped  water.
Table  8 shows  the average  amount  of subsidy  Table  8
received by  each  household with  a  water  Average  monthly  subsidy  per household,  by quintile,  US$
connection.  In Managua  the global average  month
monthly  subsidy  is $8.08  per household  and  the
amount  received  varies  little by income  level.  In  1  2  3  4  5  Total
Panama the average is $10.88 per month and  Managua  7.28  12.04  7.75  7.20  6.14  8.08
varies little across income groups. In Merida
there  is  a  lower  subsidy  of  $2.72,  again  Merida  2.72  3.21  2.85  3.19  1.64  2.72
uniformly distributed. In the three  Salvadoran  Sonsonate -0.14  -0.01  -1.99  -0.35  -1.32  -0.76
cities  studied  there  is  considerable Santa  Ana  -0.75  -2.56  -1.80  -0.74  -0.94  -1.36
overcharging,  ranging  from  US$0.24  per
household/month in San Miguel to US$1.36  a  S. Miguel  0.49  -0.83  0.50  -0.06  -1.29  -0.24
month  in  Santa  Ana.  In  San  Miguel  and  Panama  &  11.13  9.25  10.24  11.03  12.75  10.88
Sonsonate  the over charging  for the lowest  Col.
income  groups  is much lower  than  that for the
higher  income  groups.  Source:  Derived  frorn  tables  1 through  7.
8Table  9  Table  9  shows total  monthly subsidy by
quintile, taking account of the proportion  of
Total  monthly  subsidy  received  by all households  in each  households  connected to  the  system. The
quintile,  US$  month  systems  in Managua  and Panama are both
1  2  3  4  5  Total  heavily  subsidized,  to the tune  (respectively)  of
$1.3 million and $2.4 million per month. In
Managua  231,263  399,205  259,705  238,797  205,555  1,334,524  each  case,  this  subsidy  is distributed  fairly
Merida  18,869 22,266  19,716  22,122  11,331  94,305  evenly across income groups, with rich and
Sonsonate  -250  -13  -4,212  -814  -3,138  -8,427  poor  benefiting alike.  In  Merida the  total
subsidy  is much lower ($94,000  per month),
Santa  Ana  -3,784 -14,156 -10,587  -4,394  -5,656  -38,577  reflecting  the smaller  size of the city and the
S.  Miguel  1,120  -2,271  1,405  -202  -4,686  -4,635  lower subsidy per cubic meter. In El Salvador,
the water company ANDA is shown to  be
Panama  &  493124  397,505 458,617 498,710 576,552  2,424,509  transferring  a significant  amount  of resources
Col.  from Santa Ana ($38,500 per month) and
Source:  Derived  from  tables  1  through  8.  smaller amounts from the, other two cities,
presumably  to cover  costs  in San  Salvador.
Table  10  The estimates  presented  in tables  8 and  9 are
based  on a  benchmark  tariff that reflects  the
Average  monthly  subsidy  per  household,  by quintile,  based full cost that an efficient  company  ought to
only  on  Operation  and  Maintenance  costs,  USs  month  incurr , as reported in table 2. However,  the
1  2  3  4  5  Total  water  companies'  cash  expenditures  are lower
Mvanagua  2.70  5.22  2.80  2.03  1.04  2.76  than  this,  because  in  general  they  make
Manaa  2inadequate  provision for  asset depreciation
Merida  0.96  1.65  1.27  1.54  0.01  1.09  and do not normally  pay for capital finance,
Sonsonate -2.25  -1.83  -4.08  -2.27  -3.22  -2.73  which is granted by the Government.
Santa  Ana  -2.49  -4.59  -3.88  -2.89  -3.30  -3.43  Tables  10  and  11  repeat  the  same
c  alculations  as tables 8 and 9, but this time
S.  Miguel  -2.17  -3.66  -1.97  -2.75  -3.76  -2.86  onl  th  prto  n  aneac  ot  r
*  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~only  the Operation and Maintenance costs are
Panama  &  7.83  5.88  6.62  7.35  8.46  7.23  taken in account. The  results show a  much
Col.  Iower monthly  subsidy per  household in
Source:  Derived  from  tables  1  through  7.  Mangaua,  Merida  and  Panama,  at  $2.76,
$1.09 and and $7.23 respectively,  compared
with  the full cost  estimates  of $8.08,  $2.72  and  $10.88.
Table 11  shows  the monthly  total subsidy  for each system,  based  only  on operation  and maintenance  costs.
Once  again  the  subsidies  in Managua,  Merida  and  Panama  are smaller  than those  reported  in table 9. In  both
Managua and Panama, transfers  from the central government  finance part of the subsidy.  The rest is
Table  11  accounted  for by deferred maintenance:  the
company spends less  than  it  should on
Total  monthly  subsidy  received  by all households  in each  programmed  maintenance,  which is likely to
quintile,  based  only  on  Operation  and  Maintenance  costs,  us$  shorten  the life of equipment.  In El Salvador,
when only  O&M  costs are taken into account,
1  2  3  4  5  Total  the small cities  of Santa  Ana, San Miguel  and
Managua  85,841 172,932 93,904  67,227  34,729  454,634 Sonsonate are  shown to be  veritable  milch-
cows. They generate  surpluses  ranging  from
Merida  6,623  11,460  8,795  10,682  93  37,653 $30,000 to $98,000 per month for  the water
Sonsonate  -4,031  -3,681  -8,627  -5,307  -7,630  -29,276  company  ANDA,  to  help  offset  deficits
Santa  Ana  -12,579 -25,375 -22,867 -17,216 -19,827  -97,865 elsewhere.
S.  Miguel  -4,944  -10,014  -5,559  -9,163  -13,625  -43,305
Panama  &  346,849 252,614 296,341 332,624 382,785 1,611,214
Col.
Source:  Derived  from  tables  I through  8.
9Table  12  The estimates derived above can be used to  calculate  the  distribution  of  total
Percentage  of  total subsidy received  by each quintile,  and  subsidy.12 Table  12  summarizes  the
progressivity  index  for  each  system,  /l1  findings  reported  in  tables  8-11.  In
1  2  3  4  5  Index  of  Managua, Merida and Panama subsidies
progressiveness are  distributed more or  less uniformly
/2  across quintiles and the system is neither
progressive  (in the sense that it favors the
Managua  17%  30%  19%  18%  15%  0.06  poor  more  than  the  rich),  nor  is  it
Merda  20%  24%  21%  23%  12%  0.06  regressive.  In  each  case,  the  index
Sonsonate  /I  3%  0%  50%  10%  37%  0.31  number for the degree of progressivity is
Sonsonat  3%close  to zero. In Santa Ana, the burden of
Santa  Ana /1  10%  37%  27%  11%  15%  -0.06  over-charging is uniformly spread so this
S. Miguel  /1  -24% 49%  -30%  4%  101%  0.82  system is also neutral in distributive  terms.
The  neutrality  in  the  incidence  of
Panama  & Colon  20%  16%  19%  21%  24%  -0.04  subsidies across income groups shown
Notes:  1/  For  the  three  cities  in El Salvador  the  table  shows  % of  total  implicit by these results contrasts with the stated
over-charging  paid  by  the  quintile.  In  these  three  cases,  a negative  figure  implies goal  of tariff/subsidy  policies  of protecting
a subsidy.  In  the  other  cases,  the  table  shows  the  % of  total  subsidy  received  by  the poor.  However, in both Sonsonate
the  quintile.  2/The  progressiveness  index  is  defined  over  a  range  of-1  to +1,  with  d S  MI  th  better ff  a  much
a zero  value  reflecting  neutrality,  -1 rflecting  maximum  regressiveness  (all  the  an  an  igue,  e  e  o  p y
subsidy  goes  to  the richest  quintile)  and  +1  maximum  progressiveness  (all  the  more than an equal share  of the excess
subsidy  goes  to  the  poorest  quintile).  charges  levied,  and  are  therefore
progressive in a  distributive sense. This
arises because water coverage is low in the poorer quintiles and the rich pay a little more per meter than the
poor.
2.2.2 Sewerage coverage and charges
It is clear from the foregoing analysis  that where piped  water supply coverage is high, subsidies appear  to be
relatively evenly distributed across income groups. However,  an important element of regressivity  arises from
divergent sewerage connection rates  across income groups. In  all these cities, apart from Managua, the water
tariff is the same for those with or without sewerage services,  because sewerage coverage is supposed to be
mandatory, and the charges are levied for  a  composite
Table  13  service. However, in practice, many poor households do
Percentage  of households  in each  quintile  with  not have sewerage connections  (table 13).
a sewerage  connection  At present, many of these systems are being prepared for
1  2  3  4  5  privatization,  with  major  investments  slated  for  the
collection and treatment of wastewater,  in order to improve
Managua  38  49  53  66  78  environmental conditions. This will  mean significant tariff
Merida  96  97  100  100  98  increases. In  this  context,  priority should  be  given  to
Sonsonate  50  70  71  83  88  increasing the sewerage connection rates of  low-income
Sonsonate  50  70  71  83  88  households,  which  normally  generate  bigger
Santa  Ana  57  76  80  84  92  environmental and  health gains than  the  installation of
S. Miguel  43  59  59  75  82  wastewater treatment systems. 14 To  ensure equity, only
households that  are  physically able  to  connect  to  the
Panama_  & Colo_n  42  41  67  69  80  sewerage  system  should  be  charged  for  this  service  5. This
will  also give the  operator a  clear  incentive to  extend
12  This  exercise  has  been  done  only  for the  full  cost  tariff  and  not  for the  Operation  and Maintenance  tariff.
13  When the cumulative  curve  crosses  the 45-degree  line,  this introduces  a degree  of ambiguity  into the findings.  For the
calculation  of the progressiveness  index  in table 12, this paper  simply  nets out the areas  above  and below the line to
produce  a global  figure.
14 However,  it should  be noted  that the environmental  and heath  gains  to be had from installing  sewerage  where  good
latrines  already  exist  are  normally  small  (ESA  Consuiores,  1999).  It is  always  advisable  to make  a careful  study  of the cost-
benefd  relationship  to be expected  from imposing  stricter  environmental  norms  related  to  wastewater  management  on water
system  operators.
15  Note  that the proper  criterion  for levying  the charge  is access  to the service,  not connection to the service.  If charges
were  only  levied  on households  connected  to the sewer  mains,  there  would  be a financial  disincentive  to connect.
10coverage,  as  doing  so will  generate  additional  tariff  revenue.
2.2.3 Implications  for the political  economy  of  tariff reform
The under  pricing  of  water brings  damaging  long  run consequences  in  the form of under  investment  and  poor
service  quality.  The pattern  of subsidy  distribution  indicated  above  is also  inefficient  from the point  of view of
social  policy,  since  a large  proportion  of the  total  subsidy  goes  to households  who  do not need  it. However,  the
situation  may be difficult  to change.  Unless financial  performance  is so weak as to require  large current
transfers,  the Government's  fiscal motive  for reform  may  be limited  .On the other  hand,  in many  cases,  if all
subsidies  were to be removed,  poor households  with piped  connections  would  be negatively  affected,  facing
increased  tariffs  and  reduced  real  incomes.  16
None  of this removes  the case  for reform  to increase  efficiency  and recover  costs  through  the introduction  of
regulated  private  operators.  However,  it does suggest  that, where coverage  is already  close to 100%,  the
political  economy  of reform is different.  In cities  with low coverage,  the poor will gain unambiguously  from
improved  coverage,  and have little  to lose  from tariff adjustments,  as they are presently  excluded.  However,
where  the poor already  have  access  and receive  a proportion  of the existing  subsidy,  they stand  to lose  from
tariff reform if  it is not carefully designed.  Opponents  of reform might form alliances  with low-income
communities,  who  have  a reasonable  fear that  they  will be negatively  affected  by the  tariff changes  implicit  in
sector  reform  and  private  participation.  The privatization  program  in Panama  hit  this sort  of political  obstacle  in
late 1998,  and  was  put  on  hold  as a result.
It may then be necessary  for the political  viability  of reform  to design  subsidy  mechanisms  targeted  to the
poorest  households  and  energetically  to publicize  this policy.  Many  commentators  believe  that  the inclusion  of
a subsidy  guarantee  for the poorest  households  was  crucial  to the success  of sector  modernization  in Chile in
the 1990s. Another  strategy  to promote  reform  was  developed  in a World Bank  project  in Managua  in 1996.
Poor  communities  in informal settlements  generally  enjoyed  relatively  good service  and were paying  well
below cost for water service.  However,  focus group consultations  revealed  dissatisfaction  with the lack of
formalization  and with  the failure  to replace  improvised  local distribution  networks  with properly  engineered
systems,  including  meters  (considered  a symbol  of tenure  security).  The community  was willing  to pay more  in
return for the correction  of these problems.  The water company  therefore  developed  a program  to link
formalization  and reengineering  with tariff increases  in the citys asentamientos.  A similar  program  coupling
formalization  and physical  upgrading  with  the initiation  of charging  for water  services  has been  developed  for
the  World  Bank  project,  PROMUEBA  Caracas.
Another  finding is that  centralized  systems  may be dogged  by cross  subsidies  between  cities.  It is common
for the metropolitan  system  to absorb  resources  from the  smaller  cities,  whose  political  influence  is less.  This
seems  to be the case in El Salvador,  where  all three non-metropolitan  systems were over-charged.  As it
happens,  this over-charging  is done in a relatively  progressive  way (i.e. it falls mainly on the wealthier
households).  Nevertheless,  in such situations,  secondary  cities are likely to  be strong supporters of
decentralization,  since  they could  operate  sustainably  with  a lower  tariff. It is striking  that  the momentum  for
decentralization  has  gathered  force  in El Salvador  over  the last  year  (Walker  and  Velz6squez,  1999).
16 This  would  be  even  more  clearly  the  case  in  some  other  cities  in  the  region,  which  were  not  included  in  this  study  for  data
reasons,  and  which  have  tariff  systems  that  favor  the  lower  income  households.  This  is the  case  in Caracas,  where  the
water  company,  HIDROCAPITAL,  supplies  water  to  the  marginal  barrios  without  charging.  This  is financed  by  a mixture  of
central  government  subsidy  and  cross  subsidy  from  the  richer  areas  of  the  city.  The  quality  of  the  service  in  many  marginal
areas  is  very  poor,  partly  due  to deliberate  rationing  by  the  company,  in  response  to  the  fact  that  it derives  littie  or  no  income
from  such  areas.  Nevertheless,  enough  water  is  supplied  to  maintain  the  viability  of  these  settlements.
17
113  The  demand  for improved  services
Tariff adjustments  to achieve  cost  recovery  are central  to water  sector  reform  in Central  America.  As seen in
the previous  section,  many  systems  run at a loss.  They  finance  the  shortfall  between  tariff  revenue  and costs
through  operating  and capital  subsidies  from the  government  and  through  accelerated  depreciation  of capital.
The result is a gradual deterioration  of service  quality as the system becomes  trapped in a "low level
equilibrium"  characterized  by low  tariffs,  poor service  and  limits  on access,  especially  of poor  households.  This
vicious  circle has proven  difficult  to break,  partly  due  to politicians'  nervousness  about  the political  impact  of
tariff  hikes.  Section  2 showed  that in many  systems,  the poor receive  part of the  existing  subsidy  and argued
that this adds to the political  complexity  of tariff reform.  It suggested  that the political  sustainability  of reform
might be improved  by focusing  subsidies  on assuring  access  of the poor. However,  it is difficult  to dimension
tariff  and subsidy  proposals  without  more precise  information  about  what  people are willing  to pay for water
services.
This section  presents  evidence  on the demand  for improved  water services.  It first discusses  two alternative
ways  of measuring  willingness  to pay:  'revealed preference"  estimates  and contingent  valuation  surveys  and
then  presents  the  findings  of the Central  American  studies.  For several  of the cities,  it is possible  to compare
the  results  of direct  revealed  preference  and  contingent  valuation  estimates.  These  are also  compared  with  the
benchmark  tariff  needed  to cover  average  long  run financial  costs  and  with  the tariff  that prevailed  at the  time
of the  survey.
Definitional  problems  dog  the discussion  of  willingness  to pay.  For  economists,  willingness  to pay is a technical
term referring  to  the  area under  the  market  demand  curve,  including  both  the  amount  paid  to suppliers  (market
price  times  volume)  and  the  triangle  of 'consumers  surplus"  which  lies  above  this.  The latter  is not  paid  by the
consumers,  but reflects  the fact that  they would  have  been  willing  to pay  more than the market  price  for the
intra-marginal  part  of the total  volume  they  are purchasing,  since  their  marginal  utility  is a declining  function  of
the volume  of consumption.  When  a cost-benefit  study  reports  "average  willingness  to pay"  for water, it is
referring  to the amount  an average  consumer  would  freely pay  for an average  cubic  meter of the water  they
consume,  and NOT  to what  they would pay for the last (or marginal)  cubic meter that they consume.  This
average  will always  be greater  than the marginal  price,  due to the existence  of consumer  surplus.  However,
the term willingness  to pay  has  also come  to be  widely  used  in a looser  way  in discussions  about  tariff  setting
for public  services.  Here,  it usually  refers  to the price  that the market  (or some part of the market)  will bear.
This  means  the marginal  price  at  which users  would  consume  some  specified  volume  of water.  This  is clearly
different  from the concept  of willingness  to pay as used in welfare  economics.  To avoid  confusion,  in this
paper,  the  term  willingness  to pay  is used  exclusively  to refer  to "average  willingness  to pay".  18
3.1  Empirical problems in the measurement of water demand
Demand  curves  should  where  possible  be derived  from revealed  preference  data.  These  can be taken  from
water companies'  commercial  databases  (which  hold data on metered  consumption)  and from specialized
household  surveys  (which  show  what  people  pay  for  water  from "coping"  sources  as well  as household  income
and  consumption  data).  These  data have  been used  to derive  demand  curves.19  In more  elaborate  studies,
I8 Both  concepts  of  willingness  to  pay  are  distinct  from  the  notion  of  ability  to  pay, which  refers  to  the financial  capacity  of
the  household  in  relation  to  the  cost  of  a benchmark  quantity  of  water  considered  to be  necessary  for hygiene  and  cooking.
The  World  Health  Organization  (WHO)  has  issued  a widely  used  guideline  suggesting  that  households  should  not  be  asked
to  surrender  more  than  3.5%  of  their  monthly  income  to  pay  for  basic  water  and  1.5%  for  sanitation  services.  It might  be  a
goal  of  policy  to ensure  that  the  poor  can  buy  a basic  amount  of  water  without  sacrificing  more  than  a certain  proporbon  of
their  income.  The  policy  maker  might,  for  example,  want  to set  up  the  tariff  in such  a way  that  an  average  household  in the
bottom  quintile  pays no more than 5% of their income  for a basic  supply  of water  and its sanitary  disposal.  If this is
incompabble  with the economically  efficient  tariff,  a variety  of possible  mechanisms  for subsidy  or cross  subsidy  might  be
adopted  to bridge  the gap.  However,  many  analysts  believe  that  there  is no good  economic  reason  to limit  expenditure  on
water  to a given  percentage  of income.  On  this view,  the amount  spent  on water  should  depend  on the cost of  water  in a
given place and on the preferences  of the dwellers.  In many  cities  with a stressed  water  supply,  the efficient  cost of
supplying  a basic  service  runs  well  above  5% of income  and the households  are clearly  willing  to pay such an amount,
because  they  do so.  It is  not clear  what  the  case  would  be  for subsidizing  this  consumption  through  lower  tarffs, especially  if
this  were  to lead  to an increase  in  the  volume  demanded.  If public  resources  are  to be made  available  to increase  household
incomes  in these  places,  it may be preferable  to provide  general  income  support.
19  There  are  various  empirical  problems  with  this  sort  of analysis:
12the  demand  curves  are used  jointly together  with  supply  functions  to estimate long run system  equilibrium  of
supply  and  demand. 20 To generate  a meaningful  "revealed  preference"  demand  curve  for water,  the minimum
information  needed  is the  following:
*  Survey  data on prices  and consumption  for households  without a piped connection,  who use "coping
sources".  Where  there  are various  sources  with  different  prices,  there  might  be  multiple  observations.
*  The average  price-volume  point  for households  with  a piped  service  that  is both  un-rationed  and  metered.
This  provides  two or more  points  for a demand  curve  for the  average  household. 21 The curve  can then  be fitted
so long  as the  general  functional  form can be inferred.  Usually,  a semi-log  function  is used.
An alternative  approach  is to apply  contingent  valuation  methodologies,  which  were  originally  developed  for the
valuation  of environmental  "public"  goods.  The demand  curve  is inferred  from the results  of survey  questions
about  what  households  would  be prepared  to pay  for a specified  service.  This  sort  of work  began  to be done  in
the late 1980s,  mainly  to establish  demand  for rural  water  systems  in Africa  and  Asia.
The standard  approach  in contingent  valuation  is to use "referendum"  survey  questions.  The interviewee  is
asked  how  he  would  vote on a specified  change  in the service,  having  first been  told what change  in cost  this
would imply. People  who would vote in favor are considered  to have  a willingness  to pay for the improved
service,  at least as great as the cost  stipulated  in the questionnaire.  Normally,  only one cost is put to each
respondent,  but alternative  costs are postulated  to other respondents,  so the impact  of different  prices (or
tariffs)  on the  proportion  of positive  responses  can be  analyzed.
This  approach  has its own  set of difficulties.  The training  of the survey  workers  is a delicate  matter,  due to the
need  to avoid  the interviewer  influencing  the response.  CV data  may be "contaminated"  by strategic  bidding.  If
the interviewee  believes  the response  may have an impact  on the tariff, they may deliberately  under-bid  in
order to procure  a lower tariff. If, on the other hand,  they think their response  may affect the decision  to
implement  a project  that  will benefit  them,  they  may deliberately  over-bid,  in order  to ensure  that  the project  is
approved.  Properly  applied,  the "referendum"  method  should  reduce  this  type  of risk,  but it cannot  eliminate  it.
The use of contingent  valuation  techniques  to determine  the  demand  for piped  water is especially  difficult.  The
technique  was originally  developed  for valuing  categorical  changes  (eg the value  of the existence  of a forest,
compared  with  its disappearance).  It lends  itself  less  well to valuing  continuous  variables,  such  as the volume
of water consumed in a piped service. It is difficult to address  volume in a survey questionnaire.  It is
meaningless  to ask the question:  "If the price per meter were $0.30, what volume would you purchase
monthly?"  as users  often  have  little  notion  of volume.
*  Where  a new  piped  water  system  is to be  constructed,  ex ante,  only  the  demand  for non-piped  water  can  be
observed  (through  survey  work).  However,  consumption  of  non-piped  water  usually  falls  into  a range  that  is  distant
from  that  relevant  to piped  water.  Demand  for  a piped  supply  must  be  inferred  from  other  systems.
*  Metering  is needed  to generate  observations  on household  water  consumption.  Estimated  consumption  (which
often  appears  in the  water  company's  database  as the legal  basis  for the  tariff  calculation)  is meaningless  for
economic  analysis.
•  Where  consumption  is  rationed,  we  cannot  observe  points  on  the  demand  curve  from  individuals'  behavior,  as  they
will  be  consuming  less  than  they  would  wish  to  consume  at  the  existing  price.
*  Where  tariffs  are  levied  without  reference  to  the  volume  consumed,  they  constitute  a lump  sum  service  charge  and
the  marginal  price  is  zero.
*  In  most  tariff  systems  there  is  only  one  marginal  price  per  type  of  consumer  so  there  are  insufficient  observations  to
derive  the  elasticity  of demand  empirically.  The  analyst  has  to guess  the elasticity  and  use  senstiviy  analysis  to
show  that  his  results  are  robust.  An  alternative  way  of  generating  sufficient  price-demand  observations  is  to trace
changes  in the real  tariff  through  time  due  to either  inflation  or nominal  tariff  changes,  and  see how  volume
responds.  However  this  begs  many  questions  about  the  effect  of  money  illusion  and  of  changes  in other  unknown
independent  variables  (the  time  trend),  so the empirical  validity  of the results  will  always  be questionable.
20 The program  SIMOP  generates  this  sort  of estimation.
21 It might  be objected  that piped  water  and un-piped  water  are  two different  products,  so that it is not legitimate  to derive  a
single  market  demand  curve  from observations  on "coping"  sources  and piped  water  consumption.  However,  the two can
be regarded  as essentially  similar  products  if the following  conditions  hold:  1) neither  source  is  strictly  potable;  2) the piped
source  is  not continuous  (so  that the use  of eiher service  requires  a storage  system  in the household);  3) the coping  source
delivers  water  to the household  and  the full  cost  of this  (including  household  labor)  is  accounted  for. The  first two conditions
hold  for the systems  covered  by  the present  study,  and  the estimates  of  the price  for water  from coping  sources  include  the
full  cost  of delivering  the  water  to the  house,  including  the imputed  cost  of household  labor.
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Demand for  water  of  households with  and
3.2  Water demand data generated by the  without  a  piped  service
Central  American  water  studies  Without  piped  With piped
The  surveys  on  which  the  present  article  is  based  service  service
generated demand data of both the aforementioned types:  M3  /  US$  /  M3  /  US$
revealed preference estimates  and contingent  valuation  month  m3  month  m3
estimates.  This  section  summarizes  the  findings  and
comments on their significance.  San  Pedro  Sub,  3.55  2.46  39.50  0.24
3.2.1 Revealed preference estimates  Intermediate  cities,  2.73  1.18  33.50  0.09
All  the  surveys  gathered  data  on  household  water  Hon  /2
consumption and expenditure. These are  used to estimate  Managua  6.30  0.71  33.70  0.19
the  average  price  per  meter  and  the  average  volume
consumed per month for a)  households without a piped  Sonsonate,  ES  530  1.65  29.40  0.18
service, who use coping sources such a wells and water  Santa  Ana ES  8.80  1.48  30.40  0.18
trucks; and b) households  with metered piped services22.  San  Miguel,  ES  11.40  0.41  28.60  0.18
Table  14  shows  the  average  price  paid  and  quantity  Panama  & Colon  3.55  9.51  31.40  0.21
consumed for households with and without a piped service
in each city. Those without a piped service pay between  Unweighted  5.95  2.49  32.36  0.18
$0.41 (in San Miguel) and  $9.51 (in Panama) per cubic  average
meter of water consumed, including both the cash spent
and the imputed value of the time used for hauling the water.  Consumption varies inversely with this price,
ranging from  2.73 meters per month in Comayagua, up to  11.4 meters in San Miguel. On average, these
households consume 5.95 meters at a price of $2.49 a meter, spending $14.8 per month.
The households with piped water face more uniform tariffs, ranging from $0.09 per meter in Comayagua to
$0.24 in San Pedro Sula. Their consumption ranges from 28.6 meters in San Miguel up to 39.5 meters in San
Pedro Sula. On average they consume 32.4 meters a month at a price of $0.18 per meter, spending in total
$5.82. It is  obvious that there would be large economic gains for the households without piped water if they
were to be given a piped  service on these terms.
These two points were used to derive a simple household demand curve, by fitting a semi-log function.24  This
was used together with the  benchmark tariff reported in Section 2 to determine the equilibrium price and
quantity. 25 An example is shown here for Panama.
22 Theoretically  one should  use the measurement  of unrationed  consumption.  However  an analysis  of consumption  of
metered  clients  with  different  service  frequencies  in all cases  revealed  an insignificant  difference  between  the overall  average
consumed  and  the average  consumed  by  those  with  an unrationed  service.  This  suggests  that  households  develop  storage
capacity  to meet  their  consumption  goal,  regardless  of  the frequency  of the  service.
23 The opportunity  cost of the time used carrying  water  was valued  at 40% of the average  hourly  income  found in the
income  data  in the survey.
24 Strictly speaking this procedure is only valid so long as it is assumed that the households with and without domestic
connections  are  otherwise  similar.  In  fact,  those  without  piped  water  are  generally  poorer.  However,  this  is unlikely  to cause
14These curves were used to estimate willingness  to pay (WTP), based on the area under the curve (table 15)26.
The WTP for 30 cubic meters varies from $12.5 a month in San Miguel up to $140 per month in Panama.
WTP per meter ranges from $0.42 in San Miguel to $4.67 in Panama. The estimate for Panama reflects the
high value imputed to the  household labor time used to carry water, which in turn reflects labor market
conditions in Panama City. 27
Table  15
Revealed  preference  estimates  of Willingness  to Pay,  US$
WTP  per WTP  per
month  meter/l
San  Pedro  Sula,  Hon  Marg.  barrios  42.5  1.42
Intermediate  cities,  Hon  City  wide  17.2  0.57
Managua  City  wide  16.1  0.54
Sonsonate,  ES  Citywide  30.7  1.02
Santa  Ana ES  City  wide  37.3  1.24
San  Miguel,  ES  Citywide  12.5  0.42
Panama  and  Colon  Citywide  140.1  4.67
1/ The per meter  estimates  reflect  estimated  average  household
consumption  in each  city,  derived  from  applying  the  estimated  full cost
tariff  to  the  household  demand  curve.
3.2.2 Contingent valuation estimates
In each of the cities, the  surveys asked contingent valuation questions to establish WTP for  an improved
service with  monthly consumption of  30  cubic meters.  In all  cases, the  institutional scenario postulated
metered service with delivery at least once per day. Where households already enjoyed an "ideal" scenario
(formalized service with a 24 hour supply every day) they were asked about their willingness to pay a higher
tariff to avoid deterioration  in this service.  This was done in Caracas, Merida  and Panama.
Only one  price was  put to each subject. The various prices under investigation  were distributed randomly
between different subjects. The analysis is based on the percentage of "yes" and "no" answers to each price.
In most cases, the question was put in the referendum format  In a few cases for households without a piped
service, it was formulated in terms of the decision to connect to a new service. The resulting estimates are
presented in Table  16. They were derived from  logistical regressions,  using standard methodology. In each
case the estimates were made using a linear function (for estimates of both the average and the median value)
and a logarithmic  function (for the median only)  . The estimates  can be used to infer average household WTP
for 30 cubic meters of water per month. This is a single point on the household demand curve for water,
analogous to the point for "with piped water" in table 14, but with volume fixed in each case at 30 meters per
29 month.  Since existing service conditions might affect  responses, the  results are shown separately for
households who already had a piped service and those who had none. In general, those without a formal piped
connection are prepared to pay more than households who have one.
a major  distortion,  due  to  the low  income-elasticity  of water  demand.  The  validity  of the procedure  also  depends  on the  two
commodities'piped  water"  and  Sun-piped  water"being  essentially  the same.  (see  footnote  21).
25  For the present  study,  no iteration  was undertaken  between  the demand  and supply  functions.  Implicitly,  it is assumed
that  the long  run  cost  curve  is  flat.  Section  3.2.5  discusses  the implications  of  this  assumption  not  holding.
26  See  footnote  18 for a  discussion  of the  definition  of willingness  to  pay.
27  The  proportion  of  families  without  piped  water  in Panama  is  very  low  and  the  number  of observations  for  such households
in  the  dataset  is  also  correspondingly  low.  This  figure  should  therefore  be  treated  with circumspection.
28  The  regression  outputs  and  estimation  procedures  are  available  from  the authors.
29  The  contingent  valuation  results  do not permit  inferences  about  the shape  of the demand  curve  for lesser  volumes.  As
mentioned  in section  3.1,  this would  only  be possible  if the surveys  had  solicited  responses  for a range  of  volumes.  Absent
that, one  cannot  ascertain  willingness  to pay in its full sense  from contingent  valuation,  while  one can from  the revealed
preference  data  (Table  15).  The  contingent  valuation  data  in table  16 reflect  only  the area  of the rectangle  formed  by the
price-volume  pair  for 30 meters  per  month,  and  do not capture  the  triangle  of  consumer  surplus,  which  lies  above  i.
15Table 16
Contingent  valuation  of the  amount  households  would  pay  for  30 cubic  meters
$US  per  month  for  a formalized  connection  with  meter,  daily  service,  consumpton  of 30  m3  / month
Linear  estimate  (average  and  median)  Logarithmic  estimate  (median)
Scenario:  a) Improved  or  b) New  formal  a) Improved  or  b) New  formal
maintained  service  connection/i maintained  service  connection/i
Tegucigalpa,  Hon  Marg.  Barros  4.7  5.0  4.4  5.3
San  Pedro  Sula,  Hon  Marg.  Barrios  n/a  4.1  n/a  3.8
Intermed.  cities,  Hon  Citywide  3.1  n/a  3.1  n/a
Guatemala  Marg.  Banios  12.0  21.8  11.1  30.7
Managua  City  wide  5.3  6.3  4.7  5.7
Caracas,  Ven:  Petare  Marg.  Barrios  n/a  14.0  n/a  11.3
Caracas,  Ven:  La  Vega  Marg.  barrios  n/a  13.1  n/a  10.6
Caracas,  Ven:  Cotiza  Marg.  barrios  nla  6.3  n/a  5.6
Sonsonate,  ES  Citywide  10.0  10.8  9.7  10.6
Santa  Ana  ES  City  wide  9.6  17.4  9.2  20.0
San  Miguel,  ES  Citywide  13.7  10.8  14.7  10.6
Panama  and Colon  Citywide  16.0  31.2  15.2  43.2
1/  In all but  two  cases,  these  are households  wthout  a domestic  connection  at the  time of  the  survey.  The  exceptions  are  Managua  and
Panama.  In  Managua  these  are  households  connected  illegally  to the  system,  which  were  asked  their  WTP for a formalized  and improved
service.  In Panama  they  are households  with  a poor  service,  which pay  nothing  as  they  are  classified  as "social  cases",  who  were  asked
about  their  WTP  for an improved  service.
3.2.3 The impact of income on the  Table 17
responses  to contingent  The impact of income on demand  for water
valuation questions  of  30  or
The  surveys  also  permit  the  analysis  Average  willingness  to  pay fora service  of 30m3 per  month,  linear  estimate,  US$.
of the impact of income on payment  Quintile
intention.  The survey responses  City  and  scenario  1  2  3  4  5  Cases
indicate  that the poor are willing to  New  connection
pay similar amounts to the non-poor  Tegucigalpa  3.9  4.5  6.2  10.5  5.0  471
for water (Table 17).  San  Pedro  Sula  4.1  5.5  3.4  3.8  3.5  117
Guatemala  19.5  22.3  22.4  25.9  27.9  701
The average willingness  to pay of  Sonsonate,  ES  9.4  13.5  13.7  6.9  8.2  221
the poorest quintile for a metered,  Santa  Ana,  ES  n.a.  19.1  13.8  13.5  16.0  140
piped service of 30 m3 per month is  San  Miguel,  ES  8.6  n.a.  9.1  10.5  10.7  193
estimated at US$8.9 per month,  Average  7.7  11.2  10.2  10.7  10.9
compared with between $10.2 and  Improved  service
$10.9 for the second, third and  Tegucigalpa  3.9  4.9  5.4  3.7  5.3  304
fourth quintiles.  Guatemala  9.2  12.0  10.2  12.9  14.1  820
Managua  4.4  4.8  5.4  6.6  10.1  942
However,  there is a more  Sonsonate,  ES  8.8  7.2  7.8  12.0  29.5  108
divergence between the WTP of the  Santa  Ana,  ES  8.1  9.4  9.2  9.9  10.2  236
poor and non-poor for households  San  Miguel,  ES  10.2  12.7  10.4  n.a.  28.6  248
without a piped connection. In this  Average  7.4  8.5  8.1  9.0  16.3
case(whn  th  seviceoffred  s a  Maintained  service case (when theserviceoffered  isa  Panama  & Col6n  16.4  14.5  15.7  15.0  19.9  1191
new connection) the average WTP  GlobalAverage  8.9  10.9  10.2  10.9  14.5
for the poorest  quintile is $7.7 per  n.a. =  not avaiable
month compared with between
$10.2 and $11.2 for the second, third and fourth quintiles.
3.2.4 Revealed preference and contingent valuation estimates compared to benchmark and current
tariffs
Table 18 compares the demand estimates  yielded by the revealed preference and contingent valuation for the
cities where both estimates are available. The estimates of the price at which demand would  be 30 cubic
meters a month are broadly commensurate (columns 3 and 4). Only in two cases do the two estimates differ
by more than 100%; in 3 cases they differ by less than 50% and in two cases, by between 50% and 100%. The
contingent  valuation  methodology  does  not  appear  systematically to  distort  the  estimate  upwards  or
downwards  compared with the revealed preference estimate. In three cases, the revealed preference estimate
is  the higher of the two; in four cases the contingent valuation estimate is higher. Nevertheless,  the divergences
16are in general  too great to conclude  that contingent  valuation  is an acceptable  substitute  for good revealed
preference  data.
Table  1  8
Comparison  of the present  tariff  and  the  full-cost  tariff  with the  contingent  valuation  price  and  the revealed
preference  price  at  which  demand  would  be  30  m
3 . (US$  per  m
3)
Present  Bench-mark  Contingent  valuation  estimate  Revealed  preference
tariff  full  cost  tariff  of  price  at  which  average  estimate  of  price  at  which
consumption  would  be  30  average  consumption  would
mr/I  be  30  m 3
Tegucigalpa,  Hon  0.11  0.22  0.15  n/a
San  Pedro  Sula,  Hon  0.13  0.26  0.13  0.49
Intermediate  cities,  Hon  /2  0.07  0.35  0.10  0.14
Managua  0.25  0.47  0.16  0.23
Sonsonate,  ES  0.18  0.18  0.32  0.16
SantaAnaES  0.18  0.17  0.31  0.19
San  Miguel,  ES  0.18  0.21  0.49  0.17
Panama  and  Col6n  0.25  0.71  0.51  0.40
Table 18 also compares  the demand  data with the  existing  tariff  and with the benchmark  tariff  estimated  to
reflect  long  run cost.  With the  exception  of  the three  Salvadoran  cities,  the  average  tariff  is at present  less  than
half of the benchmark  tariff,  indicating  the  need  for a sharp  tariff rise  across  the board  if these  systems  are to
reach  financial  sustainability.
3.2.5  Estimation  of demand  response  to raising tariffs
Table  19 estimates  the  average  consumption  that  Table  19
would result if water meters  were installed  and  Average  consumption  when the  price is  set  at the
the price was set at the benchmark  tariff. This  benchmark  tariff,  reflecting  long  run  cost
would  vary from 13.7  cubic  meters  per month  in  Price  per  Cubic  meters  per  month,
Managua  up to 38.7 meters  in San Pedro  Sula.  meter,  from  revealed  preference
We can conclude  that in most cases, although  US$  demand  curve
people are willing to pay more for water, they  San  Pedro  Sula,  Hon  0.26  38.7
would  not  consume  30  cubic  meters  per  month  at  Intermediate  cities,  Hon  0.35  25.4
the full cost tariff. Only in San Pedro  Sula and  Managua  0.47  13.7
Santa  Ana  would  average  consumption  be above  Sonsonate,  ES  0.18  29.4
30 cubic meters  at the benchmark  tariff, and in  Santa  Ana  ES  0.17  30.1 San  Miguel,  ES  0.21  25.3 four cases,  it would be significantly  lower.  Within  Panam6  and  Col6n  0.71  27.9
those averages, the  demand for  the  poorer
households  would  tend  to be lower  than  the rest.  These  findings  should  serve  as a warning  to planners  not to
assume consumption  of 200 liters  per person  per day  as the minimum  service  standard,  which  is the  volume
consistent  with  30  cubic  meters  per month  for households  with  5 members.
In  many  Central  American  water  studies,  this  number  is used  as a standard  planning  parameter,  in conjunction
with  population  projections,  in  order  to determine  system  investment  requirements.  The results  presented  here
together  with  the  fact  that  30 m 3 is at least  three  times  more  than  is needed  for basic  hygiene  purposes  in most
situations  suggest  that  service  standards  should  be  more  flexible.
The best  way  of achieving  flexibility  is to remit  to  the  consumer  the  decision  about  how  much  water  they  want  to
consume  and how  much  they  want  to  spend  rather  than  being  required  to pay  for amounts  that  they  would  not
otherwise  choose  to consume.
174  The impact  of water  meters  and  The effect  of metering  on  water
attitudes  towards  their  consumption  in Panamn  City
installation
Section  3 concluded  that individual  metering  may be  £
used to manage  demand and thereby avoid  over-  E
dimensioning investment schemes and  inflating  ,, 50  \
costs.  It  is  also  attractive because it  allows  a
households to determine how much water they are  |  45  _\-
prepared to  pay  for.  In  contrast, if  they  are  E 40  -
automatically  billed  for  a  fixed  estimated  0
consumption  volume and pay a marginal  tariff of  3
zero,  this will  tend  to stimulate  demand..  30  -
How  much  difference can  metering make  in  1  2  3  4
practice?  In Panama,  an estimate  was made of the  Months  since  metering  started
impact  of  metering  by  tracing  measured
consumption  over  the first four months  of metering. Table  20
It was assumed  that the consumption  in the first
month reflected  un-metered  consumption  and that
after four  months behavior  had adjusted to  the  Average metered  monthly  consumption of  newly  metered
reality  of paying  a positive marginal  price  for water.  households  in Panama  between  May 1997  and  April  1998
The  exercise revealed that  metering reduced  Months  since  metering  began
consumption  of normal  residential  clients  by 22%. In  %
contrast,  low-income  clients  and small town users,  1  2  3  4  change
whose consumption  was already  lower  on average  Residential,  Panama
than the  residential group, registered increases, city  55.1  37.6  39.5  42.8  -22%
which probably reflect the  fact that prior to the
installation  of meters they experienced rationing Special(lowincome)  270  29.3  30.3  28.7  6%
(table  20 and  graph).  Interior  (small  town)  36.1  39.8  38.2  40.4  12%
However, there  remains much  nervousness in  Source:  Commercial  database  of  IDAAN
policymaking  circles about the public's reaction  to
water  meters,  and  apocryphal  stories  abound  of violent  resistance  to their  installation.  Each  survey addressed
attitudes  to water  metering  (table  21).
The surveys  encountered  an overwhelmingly  positive  reaction  to metering  as the fairest  way to distribute  the
costs  of the water service.  However,  in cities  with poor service  quality, skepticism  was expressed  about the
accuracy  of the meters.  The studies  also found that informal communities on land with disputed  title often
welcomed  metering  coupled with the formalization  of the water service,  as a proxy for tenure. Table 22
summarizes  the proportion  of informal  users  who favored  obtaining a formalized  metered  connection;  in no
Table  21
Attitudes  towards  water  meters
Which  of the  folowing  is  the  fairest  way  to  decide  the  charge  for water?
Barquisimeto,  Merida,  Panama  City  Guatemala
%  with  each  opinion  Managua Caracas  Ven.  Ven.  and  Colon  City
Metered  volume  of  consumption  55  66  59  67  54  76
Number  of  people  in  household  14  4  4  9  n/a  n/a
Zone  of  the  city  n/a  5  7  7  n/a  n/a
Abilitytopay  25  14  21  14  39  11
All should  pay  the  same  7  6  7  3  7  11
No  opinion  0  5  2  0  0  2
city  was  this below  74%.
18One  conclusion  that  can be drawn  from these  findings  is that  Table  22
the  installation of  metering should be considered as  a  Proporton  of illegal  users  of water  services
component  of programs  to upgrade  service  quality rather  who  would  like  a fonnalized  connection
than  being pursued  in isolation,  as has often been  the case
in  publicly managed water systems. Metering  should be  %
promoted on the basis of  fairness and as a  means of  Managua  88
improving operating efficiency and lowering costs. Care  Caracas  74
should be taken to allow a couple of months of 'shadow  Barquisimeto  81
billing"  to give users time to adjust  consumption  behavior. Merida,  Ven  n/a
The provision  of technical  assistance  to help to identify  and  Panama  92
correct intra-domiciliary  leaks can also help to ameliorate  Guatemala  City  94
potential  consumer  apprehension.
195  Conclusions
This  paper  has reviewed  evidence  generated  by household  surveys  across  Central  America  on  water use  and
demand.  It used  the resulting  data  to analyze  the distribution  of subsidies  and  to compare  demand  estimates
generated  by  revealed  preference  and  contingent  valuation  methodologies.
5.1  Summary  of principal findings
*  Survey  data confirm that across  the region,  households  without  a piped water connection  spend
significant  amounts  of time and money  to get relatively  small amounts  for water  with  which they  can
satisfy  only  their most basic  hygiene  needs.  Investments  to expand  the coverage  of potable  water to
such  communities  are likely  to have  a very  high  economic  rate  of return.
*  The poor  are generally  ill served  by the current  system  of global subsidies  and incomplete  coverage
common  to many publicly  managed  water systems.  However,  where low-income  communities  do
have  household  connections,  they are normally  the beneficiaries  of a significant  amount  of the total
subsidy.
*  The disparity  of sewerage  connection  rates  among  income  groups  when  the water  tariff automatically
includes  charges  for sewerage  services  is  a considerable  source  of regressivity.
*  Contingent  valuation  survey  responses  show that the poorest  urban households  are willing to pay
much more per cubic  meter for a piped service  than is charged  at present  by the water company.
However,  they  also  suggest  that  poor households  have  lower  WTP  for a service  of 30  m3 I month  than
other households.
*  Revealed preference  estimates confirm that in many cities, if tariffs are set to  recover cost,
households'  monthly  demand  (especially  that of poorer households)  would fall below the standard
planning  volume  of 30  cubic  meters  a month  per household,  which  is  widely  used  in  the region.
*  Water  metering  is not as unpopular  as is often  thought.  Faced  with  the choice  of alternative  ways  of
distributing  the  cost  of the  service  between  users,  most  chose  meters  over  other  possible  options.
5.2  Implications for tariff and subsidy policy
*  Poor  households  without  a piped  water  connection  currently  pay much more for water from coping
sources  than those with access  and contingent  valuation  data suggest.  that most households  are
willing to pay substantially  more than the current  tariff for an improved  piped  water service.  Policy
makers  should  therefore  assess,  rather  than assume,  the need  for subsidies.  The poor are better
served  by gaining  access  to piped  water  rather  than  by the  continuation  of global  subsidies.
*  Tariffs  should  be gradually  raised  to levels  that  reflect  costs  in order  to permit  sustained  expansion  of
coverage  and  improvements  in service  quality.
*  Tariff  structures  should  be as simple  as possible,  with  a standard  flat rate per cubic  meter  consumed,
reflecting  the total financial  cost  of the system's  operation.  One-off  connection  charges  may impede
access,  so  these  costs  should  be recovered  lthrough  monthly  charges.  Any  subsidy  should  be  targeted
to the poor and should  focus  on increasing  access.  Rising  block  tariffs are an ineffective  means  of
targeting  subsidies,  because  the  income  elasticity  of household  water  demand  is low.
*  Low-income  households  should  be given  the  freedom  to decide  their  level  of water  consumption  and
expenditure,  rather  than being  required  to pay for amounts  that  they would not otherwise  choose  to
consume.  This  would  militate  for expanding  metering  and reducing  minimum  consumption  blocks  in
the tariff structure.  Metering  should be promoted  on the basis of "fairness"  and as a means of
enhancing  operating  efficiency  (identifying  leaks  and  discouraging  wastage).  But  meters  should  not  be
installed  in isolation:  they are useless  unless  the service  quality  is improved  and appropriate  tariff
structures  are put  in place.
•  Tariffs  should not be charged  for sewerage  unless  there is a sewer line adjacent  to the dwelling;
programs  should  be developed  to help poor households  finance  the connection  to the sewer;  and
investment  programs  should  include  plans  to increase  sewerage  connection  in low-income  areas.
20Raising  tariffs  to cost-reflective  levels  will have  a disproportionate  impact  on the real income  of the
poor, for whom  water  comprises  a larger share  of their  consumption  basket  than for the non-poor.
This, in turn, may serve  as a pretext  for mobilizing  political  opposition  to tariff  reform. Therefore,  in
cities  where  the  poor already  have  access to piped  water  service,  policy  makers should  consider  the
inclusion  of temporary  targeted  subsidies  for the  poorest  households  to  ameliorate  the negative  impact
of tariff  adjustments.
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22Annex 1: Survey data  used in this study
Table A.1.1 provides  an overview  of the survey  data used  in the present  paper.  The surveys  used similar
methodologies,  including  rigorous  sampling  procedures  based  on the best available  cartography,  and were
subjected  to strict  quality  control.  They  generated  largely  comparable  data  for household  income  and  wealth,
the coverage  and quality  of water and sanitation  services,  expenditures  on and consumption  of water  from
different  sources  and  willingness  to pay  for improved  services.  The executed  sample  sizes  range  from 227 to
2,163  households.
Table  A.1.1
Survey  data  used  In  this study
Survey  data  Exchange  rate
Universe  Date  Sample  size  Universe  size  Local  currency
(executed)  (households)  unislUS$
Tegucigalpa,  Hon  Marginal  banTos  Mar-95  1273  30121  9.13
San  Pedro  Sula,  Hon  Marginal  barrios  Mar-95  236  2528  9.13
Comayagua,  Hon  City  wide  Mar-95  227  6399  9.13
Guatemala  Marginal  barrios  Oct-97  2163  42104  6.1
Managua  City  wide  Nov-95  1639  170894  8.43
Merida,  Ven  City  wide  May-96  980  34637  290
Sonsonate,  ES  Citywide  Jun-96  444  12596  8.77
Santa  Ana  ES  City  wide  Jun-96  502  30036  8.77
San  Miguel,  ES  Citywide  Jun-96  347  21075  8.77
Panama  and  Colon  Citywide  Sep-98  1613  226152  1
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